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NOTE AND COMMENT 
POWER OF THE u. s. SUPREME COURT TO E'1FORCE JUDGMENTS AGAINST 
STATEs.-In the year I460, when the perogatives of sovereignty or at least 
of the Crown were asserted in England much more vigorously than they are 
today, "the Counseill of the right high and mighty Prynce Richard Due of 
York, brought into the Parliament Chambre a writyng conteignyng the 
clayme and title of the right, that the seid Due pretended unto the Corones 
of England and of Fraunce, and Lordship of Ireland, and the same writyng 
delyvered to the Right Reverent Fader in God George Bishop of Excestre, 
Chaunceller of England, desiryng hym that the same writyng myght be 
opened to the Lordes Spirituelx and Temporelx assembled in this present 
Parlement, and that the seid Due myght have brief and expedient answere 
thereof." Whereupon the lords, apparently embarrassed by this extraor-
dinary manifestation of confidence in them, declared "that the said writyng 
shuld be radde and herd, not to be answered without the Kyngs com-
maundement, for so moche as the mater is so high, and of soo grete wyght 
and poyse." \Vhen four days later the petition was again urgently pre-
sented "therupon incontynent all the seid Lordes Spirituelx and Temporelx 
went to the Kyngs high presence, and therunto opened and declared the 
seid mater, by the mouth of his said Chaunceller of England." The King was 
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graciously pleased to command the lords that they should "serche for to 
fynde in asmuch as in them was, all such thyngs as myght be objecte and 
leyde ayenst the cleyme and title of the seid Due." And though the King's 
command could scarcely be regarded as indicating a judicial inquiry, the 
lords in their extremity "sent for the Kyngs Justices into the Parlement 
Chambre, to have their avis and Counsell in this behalf, * * * * sadly 
to take avisament therin, and to serche and fynde all such objections as 
myght be leyde ayenst the same, in fortefying of the Kynges right." Duke 
of York's Claim to the Crown, 5 Rot. Parl., 3i5, 1 vVambaugh's Cas. Const. 
Law, I. 
Four and one-half centuries later the "sovereign state" of Virginia sued 
the "sovereign state" of West Virginia to recover a sum of money alleged 
to be due upon the agreement of West Virginia to assume its proportion-
ate share of the debt of the old state of Virginia. The suit was brought in 
the Supreme Court of the United States, which after prolonged consider-
ation rendered judgment for the plaintiff. No execution or other compul-
sory process was issued, however. But now after delays for various rea-
sons and pretexts urged by West Virginia the court is compelled to face the 
problem of what if any compulsory powers it may exercise to enforce the 
judgment. In its opinion rendered April 22 of this year, the Supreme 
Court, when confronted with task of compelling, as did Parliament and the 
King's Justices of old, finds the matter apparently "too high." Virginia v. 
West Virginia, U. S. Supreme Court No. 2 Original, Oct. Term, 1917. 
No wonder the court is embarrassed. For the question is one which in-
volves difficulties of theory and policy, and can scarcely be settled by legal 
principles and rules alone. At least though the case would be clear if be-
tween private parties, must not the court consider whether the character 
-0f the parties as well as circumstances may alter cases? 
The latest move in this extraordinary litigation which has now been 
before the Supreme Court eight times, is an application by Virginia for proc-
ess in the nature of mandamus to compel the legislature of West Virginia 
to exercise its power of taxation to raise money wherewith to pay the judg-
ment, West Virginia having no property subject to execution, unless it be 
that used for government purposes. There is no express qualification or 
limitation of the grant of jurisdiction in "controversies between two or more 
states" to the Supreme Court. Unquestionably a grant of "jurisdiction" 
includes, in cases between private parties, power not only to adjudicate, but 
to issue compulsory process to enforce orders, judgments and decrees. 
Wa:>•man v. Southard, IO Wheat, I, 2, 3; Bank of U. S. v. Halstead, 10 
Wheat, 57; Please v. Rathbun Jones Co., 228 Fed. 2i9; Knox Co. v Aspinwall, 
24 How. 384. But the grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in con-
troversies between states and that in cases between private parties is in the 
same clause and in language identical in legal significance. 
How then can it be claimed that the grant in the first class of cases, 
is less complete and comprehensive than that in the second? West Virginia 
answers that it is because, as a State, her governmental powers cannot be 
controlled or limited. But this position rests upon a theory of complete 
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sovereignty, and admittedly our states are not completely sovereign. Does 
the power contended for fall within that portion of the state's sovereignty 
reserved to it, or is it not rather by the very grant referred to within that 
portion surrendered to the federal government. There is no express limi-
tation upon this grant of jurisdiction, no modification of the universally con-
ceded legal signification of the term jurisdiction, and none can be implied un-
less it be by appeal to the character of the parties. But it is singular that in 
so important a matter as this, the Constitution should delegate power to the 
federal government by employing, unqualified and unrestricted a legal term 
of well defined meaning, if in fact it was intended to limit that power to less 
than the usual significance of the term employed. 
There is very little in the records of the constitutional convention or 
other contemporary material, to throw light upon the question. Chief Jus-
tice \:VHITE's opinion deals very satisfactorily with this phase of the mat-
ter citing Elliott's Debates, and The Federalist, No. 81, as tending to show 
that "jurisdiction" in its full legal significance was granted to the Court in 
these controversies. The history of the particular clause of the Constitution 
involved, may be traced in l Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, 
28, 244, 24i, 298; 2 ibid. 146, 147, 157, 173, 186, 425, 6o1. 
The fact that during the colonial period differences between the Colonie-s 
though determined by a committee of the Privy Council, were enforced 
either by royal decree or legislation by Parliament is not persuasive, for our 
entire governmental machinery under English rule was totally different 
from that existing after the Declaration of Independence. For the omni-
competence of Parliament, there was substituted a distribution of powers, 
in which the matter in dispute, seems to be definitely assigned to the Su-
preme Court. See Rliode Island v. l.fassaclmsetts, 12 Peters, 6Si, 739, et 
seq. and historical authorities cited in the margin of the opinion in the 
instant case. 
Under the Articles of Confederation (Art. IX) disputes between the 
states were to be determined by a special commission or court to be ap-
pointed in each case by consent if possible, if not by congress, and the judg-
ment, which was to be "final and conclusive," was to be "transmitted to con-
gress, and lodged among the acts of congr~ss for the security of the par-
ties concerned." As was to be expected this bungling method was very 
unsatisfactory in practice, and the dissatisfaction with the results obtained 
and the significant omission under the Constitutional scheme of any provi-
sion for Congressional participation argue that the intention of the Fed-
. eral Convention was to give that complete power to the Supreme Court, 
which the legal meaning of "jurisdiction" implies. 
The case of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, unquestionably lends 
support to the West Virginia contention; but that case involved a phase 
of the slavery question which was. already a cause of dangerous ferment, 
and was decided by a court dominated by the extreme states' right theo-
ries of Taney, C. J., and four other appointees of President Jackson. From 
a legal view-point the decision is an indefensible confession of judicial im-
potence, and while the case has never been overruled, it is perhaps signifi-
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cant that in the present opinion the Chief Justice does not so much as refer 
to it. (See an article by \V. C. Coleman, 31 HARv. LAW Rsv., 210.) It must 
be admitted that statesmen of our early constitutional period, including such 
staunch nationalists as Hamilton expressed doubt occasionally as to the 
power of the federal courts to enforce judgments (See The Federalist, 
No. 81) but this never became the accepted view of the courts, except per-
haps in the unfortunate line of cases just referred to. Over against them 
must be set the unquestionable shift of the center of power toward the 
nation, which economic conditions, the Civil War, and the Civil War amend-
ments, have accomplished. It is idle to deny that constitutional law is made 
in this way. 
Finally we have a long line of cases beginning with New York v. Con-
necticut, 4 Dall. I, and running to Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S.-in 
which the jurisdiction over controversies between states was freely exer-
cised. It is true that as the states in all these cases voluntarily gave effect 
to the judgments, compulsion was not required, but that very fact argues that 
the court's judgments were regarded as more than mere arbitral pronounce-
ments. In South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286, the court clearly 
asserted its ability to enforce a money judgment against a state, a step, 
however, which it became unnecessary to take because of subsequent de-
velopments. It should be noted, too, that four justices dissented, WHlTF., 
C. J., writing the dissenting opinion. But the latter's opinion in the present 
case must be taken as greatly modifying, if not a rejection of, his former 
view. 
Moreover in Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, and many other cases 
the Supreme Court has not hesitated to approve of the compulsion exercised 
by the judicial power upon municipalities to enforce 'the levy of an au-
thorized tax to pay judgments "rendered in consequence of a default in 
paying the indebtedness." And while the difference between the munici-
pal and the state legislatures must be recognized, never the less the former 
as well as the latter exercises state governmental power. 
While the step asked for by Virginia is opposed by many practical 
difficulties, and is by no means fr~e of doubt as to the soundness of its 
legal theory, yet on the whole the wording of the constitutional grant of 
jurisdiction and the logic of the situation point strongly to the existence of 
the power claimed. And this seems to be the view of the Court for it de-
clares: "In so far as the duty to award that remedy is disputed merely be-
cause authority to enforce a judgment against a State may not affect state 
power, the contention is adve•sely disposed of by what we have said." 
The suggestion of the Chief Justice that Congress may have power to 
enforce the obligation of West Virginia is interesting, but cannot be ade-
quately discussed within the space here available. The basis for such pro-
posed action is the constitutional requirement that agreements between states 
can be given validity only through the consent of Congress, from which 
flows a general supervisory power in Congress, which under the doctrine 
of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, may be exercised by an appropri-
ate legislation. There is much strength in this position, but in any proposed 
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legislation for this purpose, care would have to be exercised to avoid in-
terfering with judicial functions, O!" impairing already vested rights. Per-
haps a general law drawn to provide a method of enforcing judgments 
against states, and confining itself to "remedy," would afford the solution. 
H. M. B. 
PRIVILEGE oF ENEMY ALIENS TC MAINTAIN Acr10Ns.-In his History and 
Practice of Civil Actions, Lord Chief Baron Gilbert (p. 205) states that 
alienage is a disability which must be pleaded to the action, "because it is 
forfeited to the King, as a rep-isal for the damages committed by the Do-
minion in enmity with him. In l Hale's Pleas of the Crown, {p. 95) it is 
said "That by the law of England debts and goods found in this realm be-
longing to alien enemies belong to the King, and may be seized by him," 
Y. B. 19 E 4. 6, is cited to that effect. The provisions of c. 30 of Magna 
Charta clearly imply that such confiscation was appropriate under the 
common law. In case the Crown neglected to seize the debts due the alien 
enemy the creditor was, upon the termination of the state of war, entitled 
to sue. Antoine v. J.f orshead, 6 Taunt. :237. 
The severe rule of the common law was early broken into by the courts. 
In Y. B., 32 Hen. 6, :23 (b) 5, it is indicated that if an enemy alien came into 
England under the King's permission he could maintain an action in the 
King's court for the tortious taking of goods from his house. And since 
Wells v. Williams, l Ld. Raym. :282, I Lutw. 35, l Salk. 46, the law has 
been considered as settled that an enemy alien within the realm by permission 
could maintain actions, the necessities of trade and commerce having molli-
fied the too rigorous rules of the old law and taught the world more hu-
manity. Even a prisoner of war could maintain an action on a contract 
for services as a sailor. Sparenburgh. v. Bam1atyn.e, I Bos. l Put. 163. At 
least one judge, however, went on the ground that the plaintiff was no longer 
an alien enemy. The enemy plaintiff must plead his permissive presence. 
Sylvester's Case, 7 Mod. 150. The rule of pleading seems to have been 
later settled otherwise. Casseres v. Bell, 8 T. R. 166, holding that the plea 
must negative the facts which would enable the plaintiff to maintain the 
action. Cf. Boulto1i v. Dobree, 2 Camp. 163. An enemy alien commorant 
in the enemy country cannot maintain an action. Le Bret v. Papillon, 4 
East 502. 
The course of the English law was reviewed in a very learned opinion 
by Lord Reading, C. J., in Porter v. Freudenberg, 1915, 1 K. B. 857, 
where it was held that actions against enemy aliens whether resident or 
commorant in the enemy country are unaffected. In Scha11ff enius v. Gold-
berg, 1916, I K. B., :284 it was held that a German subject interned in 
England could prosecute an action in court. Judge Younger said: "There 
has been a gradual and progressive modification in the rules of the old law 
in their restraint and discouragement of aliens. It is, as I have already 
indicated, not the nationality, but the residence and business domicil of the 
plaintiff that are now all important. If these are in enemy country a plain-
tiff may not sue, whatever his nationality, even if he be a friend. If these 
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are in friendly or neutral territory, he may sue, even if he be an enemy born. 
Prima facie all persons resident in this country are entitled to have access 
to the Courts, and, although it may still be that an alien enemy plaintiff 
resident here must also show that he is here with the license, actual or im-
plied, of the King, still even so, as has been held by Sargant, J., in Princess 
Thurn and Ta~is v. Moflitt, (1915), l Ch. 58, the registration which the 
plaintiff has effected is sufficient evidence of such a license." Internment 
was deemed no revocation of the licence. 
, The view expressed by Judge Younger that if the residence and business 
domicil of the plaintiff are in a friendly or neutral country the courts are 
open to him, does not seem to be settled by authoritative rulings. To allow 
a subject of an enemy country so domiciled to use the processes of the 
court would seem to open the door to assistance to the enemy, for the only 
prevention of communication between such plaintiff and his home country 
would be the more or less uncertain control of the sea and other means 
of travel. See the opinion of Yeates, J., in Russel v. Skipwith, 6 Binn. 241. 
In support of the view expressed by Judge Younger may be cited the dic-
tum of Lord Lindley in Janso1i v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd. 
(1902) A. C. 484, 505, and the undisposed of case, In re Mary Duchess of 
Sutherland, 31 T. L. R 248, 394- See, however, Van Uden v. Burrell, 1916, 
s. c. 391. 
The leading case in the United States is Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns 6g, 
in which Chief Justice KENT stated the law essentially as indicated above. 
The disability of alienage it is there laid down, is confined to two cases : 
"(1) Where the right sued for was acquired in actual hostility; * * * * 
(2) where the plaintiff, being an alien enemy, was resident in the enemy's 
country." Recent New York cases announcing the same rule are Rothbarth, 
et. al. v. Herzfield, 179 App. Div. 865; Arndt-Ober v. Metropolitan Opera 
Co., (Apr. 5, 1918) 16g N. Y. Supp. 944-
Where there were several alien enemy plaintiffs some non-resident and 
some resident it was held that the suit, which was indivisible in nature, 
should be stayed during the continuance of the war. Speidel v. Barstow 
Co., 243 Fed. 621. But in another case where there were two alien enemy 
plaintiffs one resident and the other non-resident the suit being for restric-
tive relief only, it was held that no stay would be granted, the court largely 
relying upon the now generally discredited statement of the President that 
the war was with the German government not the German people. Posselt 
v. D'Espard, 87 N. J. Eq. 571. If the defendant had been able to show 
that the non-resident plaintiff was the Kaiser or a member of his General 
Staff perhaps the conclusion might have been otherwise. As to the situa-
tion where the plaintiff is a corporation organized in this country but really 
owned and controlled by non-resident alien enemies, see Fritz Schulz Jr. 
Co. v. Raimes & Co., 166 N. Y. S. 567, 16 MICH. L. REv. 45. Cf. Daimler 
Co. v. C01itinental Tyre and Rubber Co. (1916) 2 A. C. 307. 
It is perhaps unnecessary to state that the class of aliens that may be 
permitted to resort to the courts may be enlarged or cut down by the legis-
lative body. R W. A. 
NOTE AND COMMENT 
Pow.ER oF THt STATr: To Rr:QUIRt WoRK ON RoAns.-That a state has 
inherent power to require every able-bodied man within its jurisdiction to 
labor on public roads near his residence without direct compensation, has 
been well established by custom and precedent, but whether a state is justi-
fied in exacting a contribution of property for public service on the roads 
is a question which has only recently come before the courts. In Galoway v. 
State, (Tenn., 1918), 202 S. W. 76, a statute requiring any person' who 
owned a wagon and team to contribute the same for road work for a few 
days, and also to provide the necessary feed for each team, was held con-
stitutional as regards the furnishing of the wagon and team, but unconstitu-
tional as regards the requisition of the feed. In the only other case to be 
found directly involving the compulsory use in road work of animals and 
implements, the court arrived at a conclusion directly in conflict with that 
reached in Galoway v. State. See T-0011e v. State, 178 Ala. 70; 42 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 1045. 
From the Colonial days to the present time conscripted labor has been 
much relied on for the construction and maintenance of roads, and legis-
lation to that end has been upheld almost without question. Butler v. Perry, 
240 U. S. 328; 36 Sup. Ct. 258; 6o L. Ed. 672; CooLtY, T .. \XATION, n28. 
The right of a state to enact and enforce such legislation has been consid-
ered as referable either to the power of taxation or to the police power. The 
correct view would seem to be that, although the burden assumes the form 
of labor, it is, nevertheless, in its essential nature, taxation, and it must be 
levied on some principle of uniformity. Short v. State, 80 Md. 392; Gallo-
way v. Tavares, 37 Fla. 58; Hassett v. Walls, 9 Nev. 387. Cases may be 
found which are apparently in conflict with the above view, the courts 
treating the requisition of labor as a regulation imposed under the police 
power similar in character to military service and jury duty, but in most 
of these cases the court could have called the burden taxation without im-
pairing their decision in any way, simply holding that the work required 
was not a tax of the particular kind prohibited by the Constitution. Thus 
in Pleasant v. Kost, 29 Ill. 490, it was held that the assessment of labor was 
not a tax within the constitutional provision declaring that taxes levied for 
corporate purposes shall be uniform as to persons and property within the 
limits of such body; in J ohnso1i v. J.f aeon, 62 Ga. 645, that it is not a poll 
ta.v;: within the constitutional provision relating to poll ta.xes; in State v. 
Sharp, 125 N. C. 628; 34 S. E. 264; 74 Am. St. Rep. 663, that working the 
roads is not a tax within the meaning of a constitutional provision requir-
ing taxes to be levied ad valorem on property. See also State v. Wheeler, 
141 N. C. 773, 53 S. E. 358, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) n39 and note. 
These statutes requiring labor on the roads usually provide that the 
laborers should bring with them such tools and implements as the overseer 
should request. The North Carolina statute is typical of this general class 
of statutes. See Sec. 2720, Revisal of 1905· It appears that during the early 
history of this country while slaves were regarded as property, statutes 
often required owners to send their slaves to work the roads. Galoway v. 
State, S11pra, Toone v. State, supra. In Blackstone's time the custom was 
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prevalent of requiring the use of teams along with personal services. 
BLACKSTON£, CoMMSN'l'AlUES, Bk. 1, p. 358. Thus, in whichever light we 
view the conscription of wagons and teams, whether as a tax or as a duty 
owed the state, the correctness of the decision in Galoway v. State, supra, 
seems unquestionable. See also Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 504, 
28 Am. Dec. 259. The right to make compulsory use of timber, gravel and 
other materials in road work, taken from land outside the limits of the 
highway, must be distinguished from the requisition of tools and animals. 
The former is purely an exercise of the power of eminent domain, an un-
equal burden falling upon those individuals whose property is taken, and 
compensation must be made for the materials taken. Posey Township v. 
Smour, 42 Ind. App. 58o. See note 42 L. R. A. (N. $.) 1045. 
The court in Galoway v. State, supra, has attempted to draw a distinc-
tion between exacting a contribution of the services of the wagon and 
horses and the appropriation of the feed, arguing that the former is merely 
an impressment for temporary service while the latter leaves nothing to be 
returned to the owner. The validity of this distinction is certainly open 
to question. The state can require a man's labor or the use of his tools and 
animals for a reasonable period, and this particular labor, and this particu-
lar use of his property during the period of service, are gone just as abso-
lutely as any feed consumed by his horses. Further, if the burden im-
posed by the statute is considered in the nature of a tax, and it is sub-
mitted that it should be, there is absolutely no basis for declaring the ap-
propriation of the feed unconstitutional. In the early days of our history, 
commodities were commonly received in payment of taxes, and at the pres-
ent time the legislature may require taxes to be paid in money, labor or any 
other medium that it may see fit. William's Case, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 186, 
255; Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass. 144; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71; 
CooUY, TAXA'l'ION, p. 15. J. w. T. 
EFFtC'l'IVSNtsS OF ORAi CoN'l'RAC'l'S, Wl'l'HIN 'l'HS S'l'A'l'U'l'S OF FRAUDS.-
In Morris v. Baron and Co., (House of Lords, 1917), 87 L. J. R. (K. B.) 
145, plaintiff and defendant had entered into a contract of sale and plaintiff, 
as vendor, had delivered part of the goods agreed upon. Delivery of the 
remainder would have been a condition precedent to any recovery by the 
plaintiff. This contract, however, was followed by a second one, not in 
writing, whereby plaintiff was absolved from delivering the rest of the 
goods, but by which he agreed that he would deliver them if the defendant 
should so request. Thereafter plaintiff brought this action for the "price" 
of the goods delivered. The defendant set up, by way of counterclaim, 
plaintiff's failure to deliver the rest of the goods as requested under the 
second contract. The court held that the second contract, although not in 
writing, absolved the plaintiff from having to deliver all the goods under 
the first contract, and therefore allowed him to recover for the goods de-
livered, but that, because it was not in writing, the defendant could not 
maintain his counterclaim for breach of it. 
NOTE AND COMMENT 
In Noble v. Ward, 35 L. J. Ex. 81, L. R. 2 Ex. 135, the defendant had 
contracted to buy goods from the plaintiff and was sued for his refusal to 
accept and pay for them. He defended on the ground that this contract had 
been rescinded by a later oral one substituted for it. The court held that 
because the second agreement did not conform to the requirements of sec. 17 
of the statute of frauds it did not have the effect, as a matter of law, of 
rescinding the first one. This case was interpreted in Morris v. Baron and 
Co. as holding, at most, only that a variation by agreement not in writing 
would not be recognized, and that it should have been left to the jury to 
say whether the parties intended by their new oral contract to rescind the 
prior written one. It was distingnished from the principal one on the 
ground that the parties did intend by their second contract to rescind the 
first one, and that such rescision would be effective even though not in writ-
ing. 
There is much conflict in the decisions as to whether a contract within 
the Statute of Frauds can be varied by oral agreement as to time of per-
formance and kindred matters. Neppach v. Oregon, etc. R. R. 46 Ore. 374, 
7 Ann. Cas. 1035, and cases there collected, (holding that the oral extension 
of time will be recognized as valid when it has been acted upon, at least.) 
Actual rescission of a contract by oral agreement is effective, even though 
the contract itself be one within the Statute. Goman v. Salisbury, l Vern. 
240; Proctor v. Thompson, 13 Abbott N. C. (N. Y.) 340. So also, although 
the authority is scant, a contract in writing as required by the Statute can be 
rescinded by the substitution of an oral contract, if the parties intend to 
rescind thereby. Goss v. Lord Nugent, 5 B. and Ad. 58 (dictum); Gilbert v. 
Hall, l L. J. Ch. 15 (at least in equity); Reed v. McGrew, 5 0. 376; Dear-
bom v. Cross, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 48. The court in the principal case evidently 
treated the second contract as evidencing an intent to abrogate the original 
contract. 
The court also distinguished the principal case from Noble "'· Ward on 
the ground that the statute under which that case was decided declared that 
a contract not in conformity with it should not be "allowed to be good," 
while the Sale of Goods Act, which governed Morris v. Baron aiid Co., 
provided only that it should not "be enfo:rced by action." This at once 
raises the question whether there is not an intent behind the Statutes broader 
than their literal wording might imply. The preamble of the original Stat-
ute might lead one to suppose that its object was to do away with certain 
oral contracts, "For prevention of many fraudulent practices which are 
commonly endeavored to be upheld by Perjury and Subornation of Per-
jury." This is the view of the court in King v. Welcome, 5 Gray (Mass.) 
41. The action was in quantum 111er11it for services rendered, and the de-
fense was ·that they were rendered under an oral contract not to be per-
formed within a year, which plaintiff had broken. Although the Massachu-
setts statute provided only th?-t no action should be brought on such a con-
trac.t, the court held that, "So far as it concerns the prevention of fraud 
and perjury, the same objection lies to the parol contract, whether used for 
the support of, or in defense to an action. The gist of the matter is, that, 
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in a court of law and upon important interests, the party shall not avail 
himself of a contract resting in words only, as to which the memories of 
men are so imperfect, and the temptations to fraud and perjury so great." 
"Looking at the mere letter of the statute, the suggestion is obvious, that 
no action is brought upon this contract. * * * The difference, it is clear, 
is not one of principle." Accordingly the use of the oral contract even in de-
fense was denied. So also in Scotten v. Brown, 4 Har. (Del.) 324. it was 
said, "The danger in this respect (false testimony) and the necessity of the 
rule which the statute prescribes, are equally strong, whether the suit is 
directly upon the contract, or the contract is sought to be proved inciden-
tally and by way of defense." Acc., Bernier v. Cabot Mfg. Co., 71 Me. 5o6. 
A vendee in possession under an oral contract of sale can not set up the 
contract in defense· to an action of ejectment. Zeuske v. Zeuske, 55 Ore. 65, 
Ann. Cas. 1912 A. 557, and cases there collected. 
On the other hand, Biackstone's sole comment is that "The statute of 
frauds and perjuries (was) a great and necessary security to private prop-
erty." Co:i.n.r:ENTARn:S, Bk. 4, *p. 440. If protection to property was the moti-
vating intent of the Statute a~d its true justification, the distinction based 
on verbiage that is made in Morris v. Baron and Co. is eminently proper. 
This is the view, undoubtedly, of most courts. The opinion in Gray v. Gray, 
2 J. J. Marshall (Ky). 21, thus expresses it, "The letter of the statute of 
frauds does not declare a parol contract for land void, it only refuses to 
give a remedy for the enforcement or breach of such a contract; but the 
contract itself may for the purpose of defense, be used as a shield to pro-
tect the defendant against unconscionable demands, and claims growing out 
of the contract." In accord with this doctrine, it is generally held that 
in a suit on the common counts a contract may be used in defense, even 
though it does not accord with the Statute. Philbrook v. Belknap, 6 Vt. 
383; Weber v. Weber, (Ky.), 76 S. W. 507; Laffey v. Kaufman, 134 Cal. 
391; M~Kinney v. Harvie, 28 Minn. 18; Sims v. Hutchins, 8 S. & M. (Miss.) 
328; Schechinger v. Gault, 35 Okla. 416, (even though the Statute declares 
it "invalid"). 
This is not usually the rule, however, where the statute says that such a 
.i:ontract is "void." Donaldson's Admr; v. Waters' Admr. 30 Ala. 175; Nel-
son v. Shelby Mfg. Co., g6 Ala. 515; Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418; Lemon 
v. Randall, 124 Mich. 687; Salb v. Campbell, 65 Wis. 405. Neither is it the 
rule when the defendant is himself in default under the contract. In such 
cases, however, the inadmissability of the contract is not due to the Statute 
but because the defendant's acts have rescinded it. Jackson v. Stearns, 58 
Ore. 57; Booker v. Wolf, 195 Ill. 365; Burlingame v. Bur{ingame, 7 Cow. 
(N. Y.) 92; Shute v. Dorr, 5 Wend. 204 (on the double ground that it had 
been rescinded and that it was "void" under the N. Y. Statute); Cf. Jelli-
son v. Jordan, 68 Me. 373 (apparently because of the Statute). In these 
cases the recovery is allowed, of course, not for breach by the defendant 
of the oral contract, but because of his implied promise arising out of un-
just enrichment. Loss sustained by the plaintiff, not resulting in enrichment 
of the defendant, can not be recovered. Gazzam v. Simpson, n4 Fed. 71; 
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Dowling v. McKe1mes, 124 Mass. 478. It seems that contracts which do 
not accord with the Statute may nevertheless have an effect in showing the 
intent in an escrow. See supra, p. 569 ff. The fact that a contract is unen-
forceable because not in writing does not prevent its use to show value in 
actions of quasi-contract, J.111rphy v. De Haan, u6 Iowa 61; co1itra, be-
cause "void" by statute, Sutton v. Rowley, 44 Mich. II2; or to show the 
amount of rent due, Evans v. Winona Lumber Co., 30 Minn. 515; Steele v. 
Anheuser-Busch Assn., 57 Minn. 18; or to show damage resulting from 
tort by a third party, Burruss v. Hines, 94 Va. 413; or that a settled claim 
had a real basis, Michels v. West, 109 !IL App. 418; or to show reason for 
money paid to defendant, Coughlin v. Knowles, 7 Met. (Mass.) 57. It is 
unnecessary to cite authority to the effect that parties unconnected with a 
contract can not collaterally attack it as "void." This is true even where 
the defendant's liability results only from performance by plaintiff of a con-
tract which could not have been enforced because of the Statute. Beal v. 
Brown, 13 Allen (Mass .. ) II4. In suit for specific performance of a writ-
ten contract to sell land the defendant was allowed to show that the plain-
tiff had orally contracted to re-sell the land to him. Frith v. Alliance In-
vestment Co., 49 Can. Sup. Ct. 384, Ann. Cas. 1914 D. 458. It is also very 
generally held that the Statute must be affirmatively pleaded as a defense, 
since the contract gives a legal right until advantage is taken of the Statute. 
Crane v. Powell, 139 N. Y. 379; Citty v. l11a1iufacturing Co., 93 Tenn. 276. 
As to the interpretation of the Statute, therefore, a statement from Evans 
v. Winona Lumber Co., S11pra, is applicable. "This rule may not be logi-
cal-very likely it is not, as an original proposition,; but that it is the rule 
established by the authorities there can be no doubt." J. B. W. 
ScoPE OF THE DOCTRINE OF RYLANDS v. FLETCH£R.-A study of the doctrine 
of Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. I Ex. 265, logically resolves itself into two con-
siderations: first the theoretical merits of the rule, and second, its scope. 
For a discussion of the first aspect of such an analysis, see 29 HAR.v. L. REV. 
Sox; 2 CooLEY, ToRTS, n83-u87; B1GSLOW, ToRTS, 492. It is the purpose of 
this note to consider the scope of this "doctrine of absolute liability'' as now 
applied by the English Courts. 
In Rylands v. Fletcher, D had constructed a reservoir on his land, the 
water of which escaped, due to no negligence on his part, damaging P's 
property. It was held that D was liable, on the theory that "the person 
who brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do 
mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and if he does not. do so 
he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural conse-
quence of its escape." In Charing Cross Electricity Suppl>• Co. v. Hy-
draulic Power Co. [1914], 3 K. B. Div. 772, this principle was extended 
to apply where the defendant brings the dangerous agency upon land occu-
pied by him under license. 
However, an examination of all the important cases in point decided be-
fore 1917 indicates that the English Court-s have been careful to limit, rather 
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than extend that doctrine. In Nichols v. Marsland, L. R. 10 Ex. 255, D had 
constructed and maintained with reasonable care certain artificial embank-
ments, which were over-flowed due to an unusual storm, causing damage 
to P's property. The court held that P could not recover, asserting an ex-
ception to the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher where the damage is due to an act 
of God, or vis major,-such as an extraordinary rainfall, which it is prac-
tically, though not physically, impossible to resist. Nugent v. Smith, I C. P. 
Div. 423, 435-438, decided that a carrier might be protected from a loss 
.occasioned by an act of God, if the loss could have been prevented by no 
reasonable precaution, even though it was not absolutely impossible to pre-
vent it. Cockburn, C. ]., said: "That a storm at sea is included in the term 
'act of God' can admit of no doubt whatever." See also Forward v. Pit-
tard, I T. R. 27, 33. Carstairs v. Taylor, 6 Ex. p. 216, semble, held that D 
was not liable for damage consequent to the gnawing of a hole by rats in 
D's water box, on the ground that such was a vis major. 
A second limitation, where the damage is wrought by the act of a third 
person, is propounded in Box v. Jubb, 4 Ex. Div. 76. P sued for damages 
caused by the overflow of D's reservoir owing to the emptying therein of the 
water from the reservoir of a third party. Held, that D was not liable, the 
culpable act not being that of D, who was free from fault, but of a third 
party. This principle was affirmed in Rickards v. Lothian, 38 A. C. 263, 277, 
where the damage resulted fr
0
om the stoppage of the drain to D's reservoir 
by some third party, D being guilty of no negligence. 
On the theory that the reason for the rule is one of social and eco-
nomic expedience, as pointed out in the opinibn of Lords Cairns in Ryla1ids 
v. Fletcher, many cases are held not to come within the reason, and hence 
not within the operation of the rule. Thus, Smith v. Ke1irick, 7 C. B. 515, enun-
ciated the doctrine that it is the right of each of the owners of adjoining 
mines to work his own mine in the manner which he deems most beneficial 
and convenient to himself, although the natural consequence may be that 
some prejudice will accrue to the owner of the adjoining mine; so long as 
such prejudice does not arise from the negligent or malicious conduct of 
his neighbor. See also Wilson v. Waddell, 2 A. C. 95; Smith v. Fletcher, 9 
Ex. 64 semble. But he has no right by pumping or otherwise to be an active 
agent in sending water from his mine into an adjoining mine. Baird v. 
Williamson, rs C. B. (N. S.) 376. In Blake v. Woolf, 2 Q. B. 426, the dam-
age was caused by a leak in D's cistern, which was located on the floor above P. 
Held, that D was not liable, it being a reasonable user for him to bring a 
cistern on his .premises in the way he had done, and he being guilty of no 
laches. According to the case of 1-Ving v. London General Omnibus Co. 
[1909] 2 K. B. Div. 652, 666, in order for the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletch-
er to be applicable "it is for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant has 
committed a nuisance." On this ground the court held that P could not r~ 
cover for injuries due to the reasonably careful operation of an omnibus by 
D, no evidence having been introduced to prove that the omnibus was so 
dangerous as to constitute a nuisance. Where a public interest demands the 
maintenance of a dangerous agency, such as a reservoir or water mains for 
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the purpose of supplying the public with water, it is held that the defendant 
is only liable when negligent. See the opinion of Bramwell, B., in Nichols 
v. Marsland, supra; Green v. Chelsea Waterworks Co., 70 L. T. R. 547 
(where the laying of the mains was authorized by an Act of Parliament); 
Madras Railway Ca. v. Zemindar, 30 L. T. (N. S.) 770 (where the Indian 
tanks in question had existed from time immemorial). 
As the above cases indicate, the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher has been 
limited and confined to such an extent that, in the words of Dean Thayer, 29 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 801, "if the two rules of law, namely the doctrine of Ry-
lands v. Fletcher and the rule prevailing where the case is rejected and the 
defendant's liability depends on negligence, be compared in their practical re-
sult, the difference between the two in the actual protection given by the 
law to the injured person is not very great." In speaking of the same 
matter, Sir Frederick Pollock, in his book on the law of fraud in British 
India, comments: "In every case of the kind which has been reported since 
Rylands v. Fletcher, that is, during the last twenty-five years, there has 
been a manifest inclination to discover something in the facts which took 
the case out of the rule." But this apparent tendency to restrict and limit the 
doctrine promulgated in that celebrated case seems not only to have been 
checked and retracted, but to have been cast in the opposite direction. The 
restriction now seems to have been attenuated to such an extent as to hold 
the defendant liable where the damage is caused by an act of God. See the 
decision of House of Lords in Corporaticm of Greenock v. Caledo11ian Rail-
way Co., II7 L. T. 483, decided in Dec., 1917. 
D, a municipal corporation, had constructed a pond on land acquired by 
them for purposes of a public park, by the diversion of a stream through 
enclosed culverts. Owing to a storm of unprecedented violence, the pond 
overflowed, and a great volume of water, which would have been carried 
off by the stream in its natural course, poured down and damaged P's 
property. In an action by P to recover therefor, D pleaded that the extra-
ordinary rainfall was a damnu111 fatale, or act of God, which they could 
not have foreseen, and for the consequences of which they were not liable. 
D admittedly was guilty of no negligence. Held, that P could recover; it 
being considered that there was a duty on anyone who interferes with the 
course of a stream to provide a substitute adequate to carry off the water 
brought down by even extraordinary rainfalls, and he is liable for damage 
resulting from the deficiency of the substitute which he has provided for 
the natural channel. According to the reasoning of the court, such dam-
age is not in the nature of dammim fatale, but is the direct result of ob-
structing a natural watercourse. 
The decision in the principal case was based upon the adjudication in 
Kerr v. Earl cf Orkney, 20 Sess. Cases 298. It was there held that P 
could recover for damages sustained through the bursting of a dam, con-
sequent upon a very excessive rainfall. But this holding is no authority to 
sustain the position taken in the instant case, because there was an express 
finding that D was negligent in the construction of the dam. See the find-
ings by Sheriff in note on p. 300. The Lord Ordinary in his opinion said 
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that "there is evidence in process that the same was in some respects in-
sufficient and inadequate." And Lord Justice Ct,ERK observed: "In this 
case the reclaimer cannot even plead great and unusual precautions. He 
had not the advice of a skilled engineer. * * * He had no proper plans 
formed by those competent to judge * * * etc." Furthermore, although 
the flood was great, it was not unprecedented. Such a rainfall might have 
been foreseen by ordinary prudence, for, as Lord Justice QERK (p. 302) 
said, "an extraordinary fall of rain is a matter which in our climate can-
not be called a damnum fatale." The words "in our climate" are signifi-
cant. 
It seems as if the principal case presented such facts that it clearly came 
within the rule of Nichols v. Marsland, so that D should have been relieved 
of liability on the ground that the damage was caused by an act of God. The 
argument of Lord Wrenbury seems specious, that "assuming an act of God, 
such as a flood, wholly unprecedented, the damage in such a case results not 
from the act of God, but from the act of man in that he failed to provide 
a channel sufficient to meet the contingency of the act of God." Such an ar-
gument has no bounds, for it is not inconceivable that every construction, no 
matter how strong and durable, could be destroyed by some act of na-
ture. According to this view, the fact that the damage was due to an act 
of God would seem to afford no excuse or defense. It would seem, too, 
that the interest of the public in the construction and maintenance of the 
bathing beach would warrant the holding that this was a reasonable use of 
the property, so that D would be liable only when he failed to exercise due 
care. See Green v. Chelsea Waterworks Co., semble, supra. 
For tbe condition of the American authorities in regard to the rule of 
Rylands v. Fletcher see the exhaustive article by Professor H. Bohlen, 59 
u. OF p A. L. Rmr. 298, 373, 423. c. L. K. 
